A standard objection to act utilitarian theories is that they are not helpful in deciding what it is morally permissible for us to do when we actually have to make a choice between alternatives. That is, such theories are worthless as decision procedures. A standard reply to this objection is that act utilitarian theories can be evaluated solely as theories about right-making characteristics and, when so evaluated, their inadequacy as decision procedures is irrelevant. Even if somewhat unappealing, this is an (...) effective reply to the standard objection. (shrink)

The very expertise with which psychologists wield their tools for achieving laboratory control may have had the unwelcome effect of blinding psychologists to the possibilities of discovering principles of behavior without conducting experiments. When creatively interrogated, a diverse range of large, real-world data sets provides powerful diagnostic tools for revealing principles of human judgment, perception, categorization, decision-making, language use, inference, problem solving, and representation. Examples of these data sets include patterns of website links, dictionaries, logs of group interactions, collections of (...) images and image tags, text corpora, history of financial transactions, trends in twitter tag usage and propagation, patents, consumer product sales, performance in high-stakes sporting events, dialect maps, and scientific citations. The goal of this issue is to present some exemplary case studies of mining naturally existing data sets to reveal important principles and phenomena in cognitive science, and to discuss some of the underlying issues involved with conducting traditional experiments, analyses of naturally occurring data, computational modeling, and the synthesis of all three methods. (shrink)

This volume provides a wide-ranging and lucid introduction to the major ethical theories found in the history of Western philosophy.

The personalistic theory of probability prescribes that a person should use personal probability assessments in decision-making and that these assessments should correspond with his judgments. Since the judgments exist solely in the assessor's mind, there is no way to prove whether or not this requirement is satisfied. De Finetti has proposed the development of methods which should oblige the assessor to make his assessments correspond with his judgments. An ideal Assessor is hypothesized and his behavior is investigated under a number (...) of such methods. The implications of these methods for the theory of personal probability are discussed. Finally, although the present interest is primarily normative, the practicability of the methods is also discussed. (shrink)

For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that is objective and scientific. Scientists and clinicians have tended to (...) endorse the objectivist position, with some notable exceptions. (shrink)

“Futility of futilities,” said Kohelet, “futility of futilities, all is futile!” Once again we are exploring futility, a concept understood by humanity at least from the beginning of the written word. Our oldest written story, the Epic of Gilgamesh, reminds us of the futility of chasing immortality. At least a millennium later, yet still in ancient times, the Book of Kohelet teaches that all human pursuits, not only the pursuit of immortality, are futile or vain—terms once used synonymously. The ancient (...) Greeks introduced an element of punishment into their stories of futility—for example the Danaides sisters were condemned for the murder of their betrothed to use small urns to fill a leaky... (shrink)

"Practice in Christianity is the second volume in what could be called the "collected Works" of "Anti-Climacus," Kierkegaard's new pseudonym. Anti-Climacus's first volume, The Sickness Unto Death, appeared just a year earlier in 1849. The use of a pseudonym is consistent with Kierkegaard's usual practice when presenting an idealized statement of his subject, be it sexual seduction or Christian theology. Anti-Climacus argues the conceptual content of Christianity against the "leading thought of the times" and also against the ethical and social (...) import of the comforts and consolations of bourgeois culture and religion which he called "Christendom." In his own mind at least, Kierkegaards presents Christianity as it must be thought and lived if it is to be authentic. The Sickness unto Death and Practice in Christianity can be and are read quite independently, but jointly they provide the basis of Kierkegaard's devastating critique of a secularized, culturally homogenized, and tame Christianity. The authors of the studies in this present volume, Merold Westphal, Paul R. Sponheim, Murray A. Rae, Niels Jorgen Cappelorn, Sylvia Walsh, David D. Possen, Andrew J. Burgess, Christian Fink Tolstrup, Robert L. Perkins, and Wanda Warren Berry, raise a wide spectrum of issues regarding Practice in Christianity, its theology, its moral and religious psychology, and its cultural, social, and political world" --. (shrink)

Hegel’s philosophy is a response to the bifurcations and antinomies that developed in Western philosophy particularly in the modern period. Although one is tempted to think that the mistakes in modern philosophy emanate from the false start of Descartes, the real trouble began much earlier. In Hegel’s perspective at least, Descartes is more a symptom than the cause of the limitations of modern philosophy. Besides, even though Descartes made his mistakes, there is a fundamental respect for Descartes in Hegel’s philosophy. (...) In this essay I shall begin with a comment on the perplexities and false starts in modern epistemology, centering on the concept of perspectivity and its opposite, objectivity. This approach is unusual, but it will throw fresh light on Hegel’s epistemology as a critical reflection upon this dichotomy. Second, I shall offer some comments on Descartes’ epistemology as a struggle against perspectivism. Finally, I shall evaluate Hegel’s effort to succeed where Descartes failed. This paper views Hegel in the context of a limited problem rather than as an innovator of revolutionary proportions, though he may indeed be such. In a very real sense modern epistemology grows out of a dispute over perspectivity and objectivity, the latter being understood, rather simply, as a mode of understanding which lacks perspective, interest, and “subjectivity.” That negative approach to subjectivity is now reflected in everyday speech and in a lot of chatter one hears around the campus. It is much easier to say what objectivity is not than to say what it is. Historically, objectivity is related to some fundamental theological notions. From a theological standpoint, objectivity is considered to be the mode of understanding that shares or is equivalent to divine knowledge, i.e., God’s knowledge of the world, a knowledge which is sub specie aeternitatis. Objectivity permits us to grasp the world as it really is, not from this or that perspective. Objectivity is a knowledge that is so certain, so clear, so distinct, so universal, so necessary, finally so coherent and so complete that it grasps totality without any qualification. That is a high and mixed expectation for human knowledge. That this exalted claim for human knowledge should be contested should cause no surprise whatsoever. (shrink)

The prohibition against psychologizing has been a source of confusion to many Randians. Psychologizing is the practice of incorrectly or improperly inferring motives in other people instead of rendering moral judgment. Rand thought that it could manifest in two ways: inquisitorial and excuse-making. However, Rand's concrete examples are preponderantly of the excuse-making type; her bright line between psychology and philosophy is unsuccessfully drawn; and in offering extended, strongly condemnatory analyses of the supposed motives behind psychologizing, she yields to the very (...) temptation she claims to warn against. “Psychologizing” turns out to be an anticoncept. (shrink)

This unique study brings together for the first time two of the most important philosophers of this century. Never before have these two thinkers been compared - and commentators' opinions on their relationship differ greatly. Are the views of Wittgenstein and Quine on method and the nature of philosophy comparable or radically opposed? Does Wittgenstein's concept of language engender that of Quine, or threaten its philosophical foundations? An understanding of the similarities and differences between the thought of Wittgenstein and of (...) Quine is essential if we are to have a full picture of contemporary philosophy. This collection of essays offers diverse and original ways in which to view their relationship. (shrink)